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Executive Summary
Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) is in charge of competition and consumer
protection policies in South Korea. Of these policies, the cartel leniency program is the most
powerful enforcement tool to regulate cartel activities which expropriate consumer surplus
and create social welfare deadweight loss. The cartel leniency program grants exemptions or
reductions in penalties to firms involved in the cartel activities when they cooperate with the
cartel investigation of a competition authority. The Korea cartel leniency program was first
adopted in 1997 and considerably revised in 2004.
The cartel leniency program can enhance the cartel detection or discovery ability of a
competition authority (detection effect). The cartel leniency program also can deter the
formation of new cartels or can break up the existing cartels (deterrence effect). However,
there exist criticisms of the cartel leniency program because the program can be against social
justice or the program can be more favorable to the big conglomerate companies. Based on
these criticisms, bills to revise the current program have been discussed in the Korea National
Assembly.
My research shows that the cartel leniency program as revised in 2004 is a powerful
cartel enforcement tool. The 2004 leniency program considerably enhanced the cartel
detection ability of KFTC. The total cartel discoveries increased about 10 per year and the
discoveries of the influential cartels increased about 9 per year after the adoption of the 2004
program. The total cartel fines and the average cartel fines per discovery also increased $215
million and $8 million respectively after the adoption of the 2004 program. The results are
net of other variables that can affect the cartel discoveries and they are statistically significant.
Considering the fact that the increasing ratio of the discoveries of the influential cartels was
1

greater than that of the total cartel discoveries and the total and average cartel fines also
increased considerably after the adoption of the 2004 program, it is hard to say that the
program is more favorable to the big conglomerate companies. Although there was no
statistically significant evidence in accordance with a deterrence effect, just focusing on the
recent discovery numbers indicates that the deterrence effect may, in fact, be occurring and
can be identified in the near future.
Therefore, leaders should be cautious about the revision of the current cartel leniency
program. The revision of the current cartel leniency program should be based on the objective
analysis on the effects of the current program. KFTC should advertise the program and its
efficacy more aggressively to get support for the program from the public.
Background
Korea Fair Trade Commission (KFTC) is a South Korean government agency. KFTC
mainly takes charge of competition and consumer protection policies. It plays similar roles to
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) Antitrust Division
in the U.S. The purpose of competition policy is to maintain competition in the relevant
market. Competition policies prevent one or a small number of companies from obtaining
more market power 1 or exercising their existing market power. They eventually protect the
interests of the consumers.
Regulation of cartel activities is one of the most important competition policies of
KFTC. Cartel activities such as price fixing or control of the total market output not only lead
consumers to pay more compared to a situation without these activities but also create social
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Market power means the ability to set the price above the competitive level and this conduct

induces the welfare loss of consumers (Carton & Perloff, 2005).
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welfare deadweight loss. KFTC has adopted and implemented many policies to regulate these
cartel activities. KFTC has increased the number of investigators and budget for the cartel
activity investigations. The total number of investigators in KFTC was 167 in 1991 and it
increased to 385 in 2013 (KFTC Organization Rule). The budget of KFTC also increased
from $4.2 million in 1991 to $93.3 million in 2013 (The Korea National Assembly). KFTC
increased the maximum cartel fine rate from 5 percent to 10 percent of the total sales in 2006.
It also established the Cartel Investigation Division in 2007 (KFTC, 2010).
KFTC also adopted the cartel leniency program in 1997. The efficacy of the program
was limited until the program was revised in 2004. There were just 7 program applications
between 1997 and 2004 (KFTC, 2008). A lot of restrictions and uncertainty to be a recipient
of the program were removed in the 2004 program revision. The number of program
applicants increased considerably after the 2004 program revision (KFTC, 2008).
Cartel Leniency Program
A cartel leniency program grants exemptions or reductions (amnesties) in penalties to
companies or individuals involved in the cartel activities when they cooperate with the cartel
investigation of a competition authority (the U.S. DOJ). To get amnesties, the companies or
individuals have to provide critical evidence on the cartel activities and have to contribute to
the final verdict of guilty. Since the USDOJ adopted the cartel leniency program in 1978,
other competition authorities such as the European Union (EU), Germany, the United
Kingdom, Japan, or South Korea introduced similar programs (Miller, 2009 and Nahm &
Kim, 2010).
Although the program of each country has the same theoretical bases, the specific
program design of each country is somewhat different from each other. Whereas the U.S.
3

offers 100 percent amnesties only to the first cooperator, EU, Germany, and South Korea
offer fractional amnesties even to the later cooperators up to 50 percent. The U.S., EU, and
South Korea offer amnesties without discretion although the investigation is already ongoing.
However, the United Kingdom and Japan offers discretionary amnesties to the cooperators
when the investigation is underway. The EU and South Korea offer amnesties even to the
cartel leaders but the U.S. and Germany do not offer amnesties to the cartel leaders (Nahm &
Kim, 2010).
It is commonly argued that the cartel leniency program makes the cartel activities
unstable because the program gives incentives to the cartel participants to cheat on each other
and to apply for the program (Miller, 2009). However, there are other theories that argue the
cartel leniency program can rather stabilize the cartels or encourage forming new cartels. For
example, Motta and Polo (2003) showed that the cartel leniency program can encourage
forming new cartels because the participants can expect smaller penalties when their cartel
activities are discovered.
The effects of the cartel leniency program can be explained by two concepts:
detection effect and deterrence effect (Miller, 2009). The cartel leniency program can
enhance the cartel detection or discovery ability of a competition authority (detection effect).
By increased confessions and cooperation of the firms belonging to cartels, competition
authorities can detect more cartels after the adoption of the program. The cartel leniency
program also can deter the formation of new cartels or can break up the existing cartels
(deterrence effect) because the program increases the probability of the cartel detections and
that decreases the expected benefits from the cartels (Miller, 2009)
Because the cartel leniency program enhances the detection ability of a competition
4

authority, the number of discoveries will increase right after the adoption of the cartel
leniency program. Since the cartel leniency program deters or breaks up the cartels, the
detection numbers will decrease gradually after some time period of the program adoption.
When the cartel leniency program has both enhanced detection and deterrence effects, the
number of cartel discoveries will have the shape of Panel C in Figure 1. The discovery
number will increase right after the program adoption. However, as time passes, the
discovery number will fall below the pre-program adoption level because the detection effect
will be overwhelmed by the deterrence effect (Miller, 2009).
Figure 1. Expected Number of Cartel Discoveries by Period

Source: Miller, N.H. (2009) “Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement”, America Economic
Review 99 (3): 756
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Problems and Research Questions
KFTC has been arguing that the cartel leniency program became the most important
and effective cartel enforcement tool in South Korea after the 2004 program revision (KFTC,
2008). However, there exist criticisms of the cartel leniency program. Critics argue that the
program is against social justice because the firms and individuals who should be punished
can receive exemptions or reductions in penalties just for the reason that they confess their
crimes or cooperate with the investigations. Critics also say that the program is unfair
because conglomerate companies can receive bigger cartel fine reductions. Based on these
criticisms, the Korea National Assembly has discussed bills to reduce the scope of the
recipients of the program. For example, one bill suggested excluding big conglomerate
companies from the recipients of the program (Song, 2013).
In spite of these criticisms, there are theoretical bases and empirical evidences to
support the cartel leniency program. The cartel leniency program can enhance the cartel
detections and deter the formation of cartels or break up the existing cartels. The program
eventually can enhance the consumer welfare and remove social deadweight loss through
those mechanisms. However, it is not easy to find research which analyzes the objective
efficacy of the cartel leniency program in South Korea.
My research is mainly aimed to analyze the objective efficacy of the cartel leniency
program in South Korea. My research will examine whether there have been detection and
deterrence effects. In that process, the effects of a few other cartel policies also will
additionally be analyzed. Therefore, my research question is broken into two parts:
1. Did the 2004 cartel leniency program in South Korea have detection effect and
deterrence effect? If so, how big were the effects?
6

2. What other factors and cartel policies had effects on the cartel enforcement in South
Korea?
Relevant Literatures
Miller (2009) examined the efficacy of the U.S. cartel leniency program revised in
1993. He analyzed the number of cartel discoveries between 1985 and 2005 and examined
whether the 1993 U.S. cartel leniency program had detection and deterrence effects.
According to his research, the 1993 cartel leniency program had both detection and
deterrence effects. Right after the 1993 program adoption, the detection number increased
sharply but as time passed, the number started to decrease and fell below the pre-program
level as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. The Estimated Number of Cartel Discoveries in the U.S.

The solid lines are estimated conditional means and the dashed lines bound 95 percent
confidence intervals with a reduced-form Poisson regression model. Panel A and B used
different polynomials.
Source: Miller, N.H. (2009) “Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement”, America Economic
Review 99 (3): 763

Miller (2009) included the DOJ Antitrust Division Budget allocation and total
corporate fines issued by the DOJ Antitrust Division during the previous year as explanatory
variables and examined the effects of those variables on the number of cartel discoveries. He
7

expected that the budget allocation would have a positive impact on the discovery numbers
and the fines issued in the previous year would have negative impact on the discovery
numbers. However, he could not find any statistically significant relationship between those
variables and the discovery numbers.
Brenner (2009) examined the efficacy of the EU cartel leniency program adopted in
1996. He analyzed 61 cartel cases which were prosecuted and decided by the European
Commission between 1990 and 2003. He mainly analyzed two effects of the cartel leniency
program.
First, Brenner conjectured that the amount of the revealed cartel information would
have increased if the cartel leniency program were effective. The increased information
would have enhanced the efficiency of the cartel enforcement by EU. To test this, he
examined whether the cartel fines increased and whether the duration of cartel investigation
declined after the adoption of the program. He found that the level of cartel fines per firm
increased statistically significantly by €31 million after the program adoption. He also found
that the duration of cartel investigations declined statistically significantly by 1.5 years.
Second, Brenner also examined whether the EU cartel leniency program had a
deterrence effect. He had thought that the cartel leniency program could destabilize and deter
future cartel activities. However, he could not find the evidence that the EU cartel leniency
program had a deterrence effect.
Song (2013) examined the effects of the Korea cartel leniency program revised in
2004. She used the data revealed in the KFTC decision papers from January, 1998 to July,
2012. She mainly compared the relevant discovery numbers before and after the 2004
program revision. She found that the discoveries of the national level cartels increased more
8

than the regional level cartels and the formations of national level cartels decreased more than
the regional level cartels after the 2004 program revision. Song also found that the formations
of cartels involved by the biggest conglomerate companies decreased after the adoption of the
2004 program.
Research Design and Data
In attempting to answer my research questions, I mainly used 23 years of observation
data on the cartel discoveries and penalties. The data from 1996 to 2013 was gathered from
the KFTC annual case handling statistics published in 2014. The data from 1991 to 1995 was
gathered from KFTC decision papers published on the KFTC website.
KFTC can impose different types of penalties to the firms involved in the cartel
activities according to the influence of the cartels. The influence of a cartel can be measured
by the degree of consumer damages induced by a cartel. The influence of a cartel can increase
when the cartel raises the price more, the cartel affects more consumers, or the cartel exists
longer. If the influence is small or normal, KFTC just issue warnings or correction orders to
the firms involved in the cartel activities. However, if the influence of the cartel is huge,
KFTC impose cartel fines or require the prosecutor’s office to impose criminal penalties
(Korea Antitrust Law). Therefore, the number of cartels which are imposed cartel fines can be
used as a proxy for the influential cartels.
Detection Effect
To examine the detection effect, I used a linear regression model. A reduced-form
Poisson model used in Miller’s research (2009) can be considered because the cartel
discoveries are relatively small counts. However, the cartel discoveries in South Korea had a
9

growing pattern and the range of change in discoveries was also considerable. Therefore, the
reduced-form Poisson model is not appropriate to analyze the South Korea cartel leniency
program.
Table 1. Base Regression Model
△Discoveries (or △Fines) = β0 + β1 △Leniency + β2 △Budget + β3 △PreFine
+ β4 △GDP+ β5 △MarketCR + ε

The main complication in my Base Regression Model is that Total Discoveries, Fine
Numbers, Total Fines, and Average Fines, all increase over time, as do Budget, PreFine, GDP,
and MarketCR, so that the data might show correlations which only indicate that growth in
one variable is associated with growth in another variable. This problem is called spurious
correlation or spurious regression. The problem is avoided by using annual differences of
Total Discoveries, Fine Numbers, Total Fines, Average Fines, Budget, PreFine, GDP,
MarketCR, and the leniency program. Then the growth over time in all the variables is
eliminated from the model. The lack of inflation adjustment in the measures is also not a
problem because this strategy eliminates any spurious correlations in monetary amounts due
to inflation. Therefore, I used a regression model which relates Total Discoveries, Fine
Numbers, Total Fines, Average Fines, or more precisely the changes in these, to Budget,
PreFine, GDP, MarketCR, and the leniency program, again in change form rather than level
form.
I used 4 dependent variables to examine the detection effect. I used the total number
of cartel discoveries (Total Discoveries) as one dependent variable. Then to examine the
effect of the cartel leniency program on the influential cartel discoveries, I used the number
of cartels which were imposed cartel fines (Fine Numbers) as another dependent variable. I
10

also used the amount of total cartel fines (Total Fines) and average cartel fines per discovery
(Average Fines) to examine whether the cartel leniency program increased the amount of
cartel fines.
Leniency is the policy explanatory dummy variable which equals one if the year
postdates the 2004 program revision and zero otherwise. Even though the cartel leniency
program in South Korea was first introduced in 1997, the effect of the first program was very
limited until the 2004 program revision. There were just 7 program applications before the
2004 program revision (KFTC, 2008). Therefore, I analyzed the effect of the 2004 program
revision.
Budget is an explanatory variable which can control the effect of the leniency
program. It can be expected that when the cartel investigation budget increases, the number
of cartel detections or KFTC caseload will increase. When the budget increases, KFTC can
use more resources to investigate cartel activities. The budget also can reflect the number of
investigators which can investigate cartel activities. Ghosal and Gallo (2001) also suggested
the cartel caseload of the DOJ may have a positive relationship with the DOJ Antitrust
Division budget allocation. It is more suitable to use the direct cartel enforcement budget for
this analysis purpose. However, it was difficult to identify the budget spent on the direct
cartel enforcement from the KFTC total budget allocation. Therefore I used the KFTC total
budget allocation as a proxy for the cartel enforcement budget.
PreFine is another explanatory variable which can control the effect of the leniency
program. PreFine represents the total amount of cartel fines imposed by KFTC in the
previous year. It can be expected that when the amount of the previous year cartel fines
increases, the number of cartel detections or KFTC caseload will decrease in that year. Firms
11

will be more cautious about the cartel activities when the amount of the previous year cartel
fines increases. Ghosal and Gallo (2001) also suggested the cartel caseload of DOJ may have
negative relationship with the amount of cartel fines imposed in the previous year.
GDP is also an explanatory variable. GDP represents the annual South Korea gross
domestic product. The annual South Korea GDP reflects the general economic condition of
South Korea. This general economic condition can influence the effect of the cartel leniency
program on the cartel discoveries or KFTC caseload. For example, when the economic
condition deteriorates, the incentives for firms to participate in cartel activities can increase.
I also included a market concentration ratio (MarketCR) as another explanatory
variable. MarketCR can be measured in different ways. For example, CR3 represents the
sales share of the 3 biggest companies in the relevant market. I used CR100 as a MarketCR
proxy. CR100 represents the sales share of the 100 biggest companies in the manufacturing
industries. I gathered the data from the Market Economy Research institute (form 1991 to
2007) and the Korea Development Institute (from 2008 to 2011). I inferred the data on 2012
and 2013 with a simple regression model because the data have not been produced yet. It can
be generally expected that when the market concentration ratio increases, the number of
cartel detections or KFTC caseload will increase. Firms can be more easily involved in the
cartel activities when the market concentration ratio increases because there are fewer
companies to collude. Ellis and Wilson (2003) also suggested that the effect of the cartel
leniency program can be affected by the market concentration ratio.
Deterrence Effect
To examine the deterrence effects, it should be tested whether the total number of
cartels existing in South Korea declined after some time period of the 2004 program revision.
12

The problem is that the total number of cartels existing in South Korea cannot be directly
observed because cartel activities are by definition secret collusions. However, the total
number of cartels existing in South Korea can be inferred from the detected number of cartels.
Although there are some limitations, it can be supposed that the detected cartels can represent
the total number of cartels in some fashion. Miller’s research (2009) was also based on this
assumption. He assumed that the U.S. DOJ discovered all the cartels with the same
probability. Brenner (2009) also concluded that there was no structural difference in the
composition of the detected cartels after the adoption of the cartel leniency program.
Therefore, I also assumed that the detected cartels can represent the total cartels existing in
South Korea.
I used the same Base Regression Model used in the analysis of the detection effect
and added some time polynomials adopted in Miller’s research (2009) to examine whether
the KFTC discoveries or case numbers had a declining pattern after some time period of the
2004 program revision. I also used some descriptive statistics to examine the probable
deterrence effect in recent years.
Analysis and Findings
Figure 3. Total Discoveries

Notes: The vertical bar marks the 2004 program revision. The horizontal bars mark the
averages before and after the 2004 program revison.
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The Total Discoveries had an increasing trend as shown in Figure 3. It was just 9 in
1991 and increased to 47 in 2000. Then it decreased to 23 in 2003 but it again increased to 46
in 2005 and it peaked in 2011. The average Total Discoveries between 1991 and 2004 was 28
and it increased to 53 after 2005.
Figure 4. Fine Numbers

Notes: The vertical bar marks the 2004 program revision. The horizontal bars mark the
averages before and after the 2004 program revison.

The Fine Numbers also had an increasing trend as shown in Figure 4. It was just 1 in
1991 and increased to 19 in 1998. Then it decreased to 7 in 2001 but it again increased to 43
in 2005 and it peaked in 2008. The average Fine Numbers between 1991 and 2004 was 8 and
it increased to 28 after 2005.
Detection Effect
The regression results in Table 2 show that the 2004 cartel leniency program had a
positive effect on the Total Discoveries. That was statistically significant at the 5 percent
level. After the 2004 program revision, the Total Discoveries increased about 10 per year. The
other explanatory variables didn’t have any statistically significant effects on the Total
Discoveries.
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The regression results in Table 2 also show that the 2004 cartel leniency program had
a positive effect on the Fine Numbers. That was statistically significant at the 5 percent level.
After the 2004 program revision, the Fine Numbers increased about 9 per year. The other
explanatory variables also didn’t have any statistically significant effects on the number of
cases imposed cartel fines.
Table 2. Regression Results (Total Discoveries and Fine Numbers)
△Total Discoveries

△Fine Numbers

10.095**
(3.760)
0.482
(0.448)

9.156**
(3.835)
0.268
(0.426)

△Leniency
△Budget
△PreFine
△GDP
△MarketCR
Constant

0.007
(0.007)
0.44
(1.255)
0.951
(2.413)

0.093
(0.91)
1.149
(1.866)

-3.585
(9.411)

-1.616
(6.635)

0.012

(0.010)

Notes: The annual GDP growth rate is used as △GDP
*** 1 percent significance level

** 5 percent level

* 10 percent level

The regression results in Table 3 show that the 2004 cartel leniency program also had
a positive effect on the Total Fines and the Average Fines. Those were statistically significant
at the 1 percent level. After the 2004 program revision, the Total Fines increased about $215
million per year and the Average Fines also increased $8 million per year respectively. The
Budget had a negative effect on the Average Fines contrary to the theoretical expectations.
That was statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The PreFine had a negative effect on
the Average Fines. That was statistically significant at the 5 percent level. The other
15

explanatory variables didn’t have any statistically significant effects on the Total and Average
Fines.
Table 3. Regression Results (Total Fines and Average Fines)
△Total Fines

△Average Fines

215.275***
(45.242)
-8.672
(5.572)

8.284***
(1.94)
-0.402*
(0.227)

-0.280
(0.228)
8.019
(5.36)

-0.02**
(0.009)
0.286
(0.291)

20.915
(22.59)
-4.909
(63.701)

0.599
(1.276)
0.62
(2.853)

△Leniency
△Budget
△PreFine
△GDP
△MarketCR
Constant

Notes: The annual GDP growth rate is used as △GDP
*** 1 percent significance level

** 5 percent level

* 10 percent level

The increase of Total Discoveries was 10 per year and the increase of Fine Numbers
was 9 per year after the 2004 program revision. However, considering the fact that the
average Total Discoveries and the average Fine Numbers were 28 and 8 respectively before
the 2004 program revision as shown in Figure 3 and 4, the increasing ratio of the Fine
Numbers was greater than that of the Total Discoveries. Moreover, the Total and Average
Fines also increased considerably after the 2004 program revision. Therefore, it can be said
that the 2004 cartel leniency program increased the detections of more influential cartels and
contributed to the stricter cartel enforcement.
In addition, the fact that the Budget had a positive effect on the discovery numbers
but a negative effect on the amount of fines can imply that KFTC detected smaller cartels
16

more when the budget increased. It is probable that KFTC expanded the number of
investigations rather than focusing on the investigations of the more influential cartels with
the increased budget. The fact that the PreFine had a positive effect on the discovery numbers
but a negative effect on the amount of cartel fines can imply that the bigger cartels were more
cautious about the KFTC cartel enforcements.
Deterrence Effect
I examined the deterrence effect by introducing some time polynomials in the Base
Regression Model. However, I could not find that there was any deterrence effect after the
adoption of the 2004 program. This result is different from the result of Miller’s research
(2009). The cartel discovery number in the U.S. and South Korea basically had different
patterns as shown in Figure 5. The discovery number in the U.S. had the declining trend
before the 1993 cartel leniency program. The number increased right after the program
adoption then it fell again below the previous level. However, the discovery number in South
Korea had an overall increasing trend.
Figure 5. Comparison between the U.S. and South Korea Discovery Numbers
Panel A. The U.S. Cartel Discoveries

Panel B. South Korea Cartel Discoveries

Notes: The vertical bars mark the 1993 U.S. program and 2004 South Korea program respectively.
Source of the U.S. Cartel Discoveries: Miller, N.H. (2009) “Strategic Leniency and Cartel
Enforcement”, America Economic Review 99 (3): 758
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Even though there was no statistically significant deterrence effect, it can be said that
the deterrence effect may be occurring and can be identified in the near future. When just
focusing on the recent discovery numbers, the discovery numbers has been maintained below
its peak level as shown in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Recent Trend of Discovery Numbers
Panel A. Total Discoveries

Panel B. Fine Numbers

Notes: vertical bars mark the 2004 program revison. I added arbitrary arrow marks to show probable
recent deterrence effect explained in the below paragraph.

The average Total Discoveries of recent two years was 43.6 whereas the average of
the previous 4 years was 64.75. That corresponds to 33 percent reduction. Since the Fine
Numbers marked its peak in 2008, the numbers has been maintained below that level. The
average Fine Numbers in the recent 5 years was 27.2. That corresponds to 37 percent
reduction compared to its peak in 2008. Song (2013) found that the formations of national
level cartels decreased more than the regional level cartels after the 2004 program revision.
She also found that the formations of cartels involved by the biggest conglomerate companies
decreased after the program revision in 2004. Therefore, it can be said that the deterrence
effect may be occurring and can be identified in the near future.
18

Policy Recommendations
Despite the criticisms of the cartel leniency program that the program is against
social justice and it is favorable to the conglomerate companies, leaders should be cautious
about the revision of the current cartel leniency program. The current cartel leniency program
is definitely contributing to increase cartel discoveries and to impose stricter penalties to
cartel participants. Moreover, in my research, there were no other factors and cartel policies
which influenced consistently on the cartel enforcements except the cartel leniency program.
Considering the facts that the increasing ratio of the Fine Numbers was greater than
that of the Total Discoveries and the Total and Average Fines also increased considerably
after the 2004 program revision, it is hard to say that the cartel leniency program is more
favorable to the conglomerate companies. These facts can rather imply that the cartel
leniency program had more unfavorable effects on the conglomerate companies because the
conglomerate companies generally participate in the more influential cartels. Therefore, the
criticism that the cartel leniency program is favorable to the conglomerate companies does
not have a sound basis.
To overcome the criticisms of the cartel leniency program, KFTC needs to advertise
more aggressively about the effects of the cartel leniency program. Although the Korea
Antitrust Law prohibits KFTC from revealing concrete information on the applications of the
program, KFTC can publish the result of the statistical analysis and can more aggressively
defend the current program. This effort eventually can change the emotions or feelings of the
public on the cartel leniency program more favorably.

19

Conclusions
The 2004 cartel leniency program enhanced the cartel detection ability of KFTC. The
total cartel discoveries increased about 10 per year and the influential cartel discoveries also
increased about 9 per year after the 2004 program revision. Moreover, the cartel fines also
increased considerably after the 2004 program revision. Although there was no statistically
significant evidence, it may be that the deterrence effect may be occurring and can be
discovered with the passage of more time.
It is not strange that many Korea people criticize that the program is against social
justice and it is more favorable to the conglomerate companies. However, considering the
effects of the current cartel leniency program, it is definitely true that the cartel leniency
program is contributing to improving consumer surplus and removing social welfare
deadweight losses. It is also hard to say that the cartel leniency program is more favorable to
the conglomerate companies because the influential cartels were detected more and the cartel
fines increased significantly after the 2004 program revision. Moreover, the cartel leniency
program was the only policy which influenced consistently on the cartel enforcement. Other
factors and cartel policies didn’t have consistent and statistically significant effects on the
cartel enforcement.
Therefore, leaders should be cautious about the revision of the current cartel leniency
program. The revision of the current cartel leniency program should be based on the objective
analysis on the effects of the current program. KFTC should advertise the program and its
efficacy more aggressively to get support for the program from the public.
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